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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

MILITARY ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS...SMART CHANGES FOR THE FUTURE

BY

COMMANDER JOHN P. CORAY United States Navy

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Military Enforcement of Economic Sanctions...Smart changes for the Future

Ву

Commander John P. Coray United States Navy

Commander Paul Kast USN Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR:

CDR John P. Coray USN

TITLE:

Military Enforcement of Economic Sanctions... Smart changes for the Future

FORMAT:

Strategy Research Project

DATE:

10 April 2000

PAGES: 24

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Military enforcement of economic sanctions provides an unambiguous resolve to influence policy change, deter aggression or shape the environment during an international crisis. These military actions represent the final diplomatic effort to peacefully alter a targeted nation's policy or coercive action prior to armed conflict. It then represents an important diplomatic and military tool in our national security strategy. Twice in the 1990's military forces were used to enforce an economic embargo. In each case, physical interdiction dramatically improved sanction results but did not completely succeed in a peaceful resolution of the international crisis. If military enforcement of economic sanctions is to remain a viable and important tool of diplomacy in the future, it is imperative that the United States take action to improve their effectiveness and flexibility. This research paper focuses on improving future military enforcement of economic sanctions by incorporating aggressive elements of information isolation and the use of smart sanctions to augment a continued robust physical interdiction strategy. The synergism of rapidly effective information interdiction and the long-term deterioration of a physical blockade add a significant potency to military operations in support of economic sanctions.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
MILITARY ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONSSMART CHANGES FOR THE FUTURE	Ξ1
BACKGROUND	1
DEFINING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS	1
USE OF MILITARY FORCES TO ENFORCE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS	2
WHAT IS A SMART SANCTION?	2
WHAT IS INFORMATION ISOLATION?	2
UNITED NATIONS LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MILITARY ENFORCED SANCTIONS	3
ANALYSIS	3
UNDERWRITING MILITARY ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS	3
GLOBALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY	4
IRAQ CASE STUDY	5
SERBIA CASE STUDY	7
RECOMMENDATION	9
TARGET WHAT GIVES STRENGTH TO THE REGIME	10
EXECUTING THE NEW INFORMATION ISOLATION MISSION	10
LEGAL ASPECTS OF USING INFORMATION ISOLATION TO ENHANCE SANCTIONS	11
MODEL FOR FUTURE MILITARY ENFORCED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS	12
CONCLUSION	13
ENDNOTES	15
BIBLIOGRAPHY	17

vi

MILITARY ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS...SMART CHANGES FOR THE FUTURE

Military enforcement of economic sanctions provides an unambiguous resolve to influence policy change, deter aggression or shape the environment during an international crisis. These military actions represent the final diplomatic effort to peacefully alter a targeted nation's policy or coercive action prior to armed conflict. Thus, economic sanctions represent a clearly understood but blunt diplomatic and military tool in our national security strategy. Twice in the 1990's military forces were used to enforce an economic embargo. In each case, physical interdiction dramatically improved sanction results but did not completely succeed. In Iraq, ultimately armed conflict was necessary to convince Saddem Hussein to leave Kuwait. In Serbia, Slobadon Milosevic withdrew his support for the Bosnian Serbs only after four years of sanctions and limited NATO airstrikes. In each case there was considerable humanitarian suffering and the regime leaders still thrive today. The problem facing military strategist today is to structure future sanction operations to be effective in the 21st century. The measure of effectiveness will be their ability to interdict in vital economic areas and convince the targeted nation to change policies or alter actions prior to armed conflict.

This research paper will focus on how to improve future military enforcement of economic sanctions. To be effective in the future, military forces must incorporate aggressive elements of information isolation and the use of smart sanctions to augment a continued robust physical interdiction strategy. This paper will begin by providing a background of terms and review how military enforcement of economic sanctions is used as a tool of diplomacy. Next it will analyze through case studies the realities of effective sanction enforcement as the U.S. national military strategy evolves to support diplomatic efforts to resolve international crisis prior to armed conflict. Finally, this paper will argue for military forces to succeed in effectively enforcing economic sanctions, they must apply elements of information isolation and smart sanctions to enhance physical interdiction operations.

BACKGROUND

DEFINING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

U.S. policymakers utilize a variety of tools to influence the policies of other governments. These tools, in order of increasing severity, are diplomatic persuasion, public appeals, non-economic sanctions, economic sanctions and military action. The economic sanction tool may be applied either unilaterally or in conjunction with other countries through the United Nations or other international organizations.

"Specifically, economic sanctions can be defined as coercive economic measures taken against one or more target countries in order to force a change in policies, or at least to demonstrate a country's opinion about the other's policies. Economic sanctions typically include measures such as trade embargoes; restrictions on particular exports or imports; denial of foreign assistance, loans, and investments; or control of foreign assets and economic transactions that involve U.S. citizens or coalition nation business." ¹

USE OF MILITARY FORCES TO ENFORCE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

The United States National Security Strategy recognizes that our country faces a diversity of threats that require an integrated approach to defend the homeland, shape the international environment or respond to a crisis. "Our response might be diplomatic, economic, law enforcement or military in nature... or, more likely, some combination of the above. We must use the most appropriate tool or combination of tools-acting in alliance or partnership when our interests are shared by others, but unilaterally when compelling national interests so demand."²

The National Military Strategy captures this concept by articulating a strategy of promoting peace, stability and when necessary, to defeat adversaries that threatens our national interests. Furthermore, our military strategy is designed to respond to a full spectrum of problems, which includes the deterrence of aggression and coercion in crisis. Sanctions enforcement by the military or an international coalition provides a clear signal of the United States resolve to affect policy change, deter aggression or shape the environment during an international crisis.

WHAT IS A SMART SANCTION?

"Smart sanctions is a phrase which describes surgical financial sanctions that specifically attempt to only target the political elite of a regime or government." This concept is theoretically more humanitarian because it does not affect the trade of goods and services for the general public. This is thought to reduce the bluntness of economic sanctions on the populace and shift the burden of economic hardship on the authoritarian political leaders responsible for the violations of international norms. This type of sanction is more politically acceptable to an international coalition as it minimizes the damage to the economic and social infrastructure of a country and shifts the burden of hardship to the regime itself. "Smart sanctions include actions such as the freezing of foreign held assets; suspension of credit and loan guarantees; and denial of access to overseas financial markets."

Recent economic sanctions authorized by the United Nations have included various levels of financial sanctions. "However, their success has been limited due to confusing legal precedence; poor coordination of the world banking system; limited application of the latest financial tracking software; and the diminished effectiveness when sanctions are not introduced immediately." Finally, it must be noted that the United Nations Security Council has never mandated financial sanctions against individual members of a transgressor state. "In the case of Iraq and Serbia-Montenegro, personal accounts of the political elite's, e.g. Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic, remain untouched."

WHAT IS INFORMATION ISOLATION?

"Information isolation is the ability to take elements of information warfare and apply them specifically to interdict or prevent an exchange of external data or any form of communication." Specifically, it represents an offensive but not necessarily an intrusive warfare application.

Similar to a physical economic embargo, information isolation works to prevent or interdict the external exchange of information from a country or regime. It's effectiveness presumes an era in which the well-being of societies will be as affected by information flow as they are the flow of material supplies. The practical application of information isolation initiatives would be applied to support and enhance physical economic sanctions.

UNITED NATIONS LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MILITARY ENFORCED SANCTIONS

For military enforcement of economic sanctions to be effective, they must have multilateral support and a legal foundation. The United Nation's Charter (Chapter VII Articles 39, 41 and 42) provides the multilateral organization and the international legal framework to authorize military enforcement. Article 39 authorizes the UN Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to the peace or act of aggression and decide on what measures to be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to restore international peace and security. Article 41 directly addresses the application of economic sanctions:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 8

Article 42 provides the punch for military enforcement of economic sanctions and opens the door for further military action by the Security Council:

Should the Security Council consider measures provided in Article 41 inadequate or prove to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstration, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.⁹

ANALYSIS

In order to present an argument for the inclusion of information isolation as a synergetic tool of military enforcement of economic sanctions, three areas require review. First, will the United Nations (Security Council) remain as a strong international body and continue to legally underwrite military enforcement of economic sanctions in the 21st century? Second, does the globalization of the world economy support or hinder the future use of economic sanctions? Finally, what lessons can be learned from the military enforced sanctions on Iraq in 1990 and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1992-1995 to support a continued and aggressive pursuit more effective sanctions options?

UNDERWRITING MILITARY ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

The United States and it's Allies have used the United Nation's Charter (Chapter VII Articles 39, 41 and 42) twice in the past decade to provide the international legal framework for authorization of military enforcement of economic sanctions.

The legal framework and subsequent military enforced embargoes on Iraq (1990) and Serbia-Montenegro (1992-1995) were never challenged in an international court. Therefore, with no legal challenge on the horizon, it is assumed that under the same international circumstances, the Security Council will continue to use these Articles as the legal bulwark for future resolutions dealing with breeches of the peace.

Both U.S. administrations (Bush in 1990 and Clinton in 1992) have used the *United Nations*Participation Act of 1945 to authorize and deploy military forces in support of U.N. resolutions authorizing enforcement of economic sanctions. Specifically, section five and six of the act provides statutory authority for the following:

The President is authorized, not withstanding any other laws, to apply economic and communications sanctions imposed by the Security Council under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. It authorizes U.S. participation in a multilateral embargo without a blockade. Section six provides for participation in military enforcement actions authorized by the Council under Article 42, which would include enforcement of an embargo through a blockade. Specifically, section six authorizes the President to negotiate a special agreement with the Security Council, which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or Joint Resolution. ¹⁰

Therefore, through both international and domestic laws, the legal precedent exists for any future military enforcement actions. However, future use of military forces will depend on the foreign policy whims of the current administration and congress. Since the high mark of 1991, there has been a growing political rift between U.S. Congress and the United Nations. On January 20th, 2000, Senator Jessie Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee addressed the Security Council. "His historic speech was a first effort to personally establish a better working relationship between the U.S. congress and the United Nations." The United States agreed to pay 926 million dollars of its dues with the promise of more reforms. What does this new tepid embrace mean for the 21st century? The United States will likely continue to use the U.N. legal framework to add synergism to diplomacy when it specifically suits its national security interests. However, one can expect a much more cautious approach to committing military forces abroad in the future.

GLOBALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY

As international trade increases and barriers fall, traditional economic borders disappear and individual economies move from intra-dependence to inter-dependence. Major corporations are becoming multi-national corporations, intricately weaving through several economies and regions. Regional and individual economies are growing and becoming dependent on the new markets, resources and services. World Trade Organization 1999 statistics indicate that the world export of commercial services has increased from \$365 trillion to \$1,320 trillion between 1980 and 1998.

Electronically, the world has evolved into a single seamless financial marketplace that functions around the clock. Execution of financial transactions involving huge sums of money is completed in milliseconds. On a typical day in New York, well over \$1.3 trillion in business payments pass through one clearinghouse inter-bank system. ¹²

Additionally, the World Wide Web has grown logarithmically. "It is estimated that there are over 100 million non-English speaking people communicating online today. Furthermore, this figure is predicted to grow to 66% of all online users by 2005." This represents an incredible portal for new market growth beyond the physical trade of goods.

These global trends in commercial services and expansion of electronic commerce will both hinder and support the future use of economic sanctions. First, when countries become economically interdependent, economic sanctions truly become a blunt instrument of diplomacy. The more blunt, the less likely a coalition of nations would support multilateral sanctions. Furthermore, the trend toward electronic commerce will make traditional embargoes much less effective. However, globalization of economies may highlight areas of dependency in individual economies that can be exploited. The wealth of a nation or regime may not lie within their borders, thus becoming more vulnerable to asset freezing.

The key to future sanctions in a global economy is to minimize the hindrance and maximize the vulnerabilities. Future sanctions must be designed with this in mind. They will have to embargo both the physical and electronic movement of wealth. They will have to be devastating and produce quick results in order to limit the adverse collateral economic impact that might threaten any coalition. And most important, they will have to target specific areas of a national economy or leadership in order to minimize the humanitarian suffering that inevitable occurs with long term sanctions.

IRAQ CASE STUDY

The employment of multilateral economic sanctions against Iraq provides the first of two excellent case studies to analyze the success and failures of military enforced sanctions as a last diplomatic effort to deter aggression and alter policy. The method employed by the United States and Allies were to embargo all exports and imports via land, sea and air. This was accomplished by having Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia cut off oil exports via pipelines; the use of maritime interdiction operations to cut off all oil an commodity trade in the Arabian Gulf; and to enforce an air embargo. The reader must keep in mind that national vital interests were at stake and armed conflict was a realistic endstate.

Were the sanction objectives limited enough to be achievable?

The objectives of the sanctions against Iraq were to use economic coercion to convince Saddam Hussein to roll back his forces from Kuwait and deter further aggression. If necessary they would have a tertiary objective if they failed, to positively shape the battlefield for the UN coalition forces by weakening Iraq's ability to defend itself from an allied offensive. From the beginning, several issues challenged the success of the sanctions and ultimately made the objective unachievable. By August 26th,1990, the Iraqi invasion force was well established in Kuwait. Saddam Hussein had captured the country and met his objective with little resistance. His land conquest secured, his intention was to diplomatically justify the invasion and challenge the resolve of the Arab community and entire world to do something about it. Second, sanctions were targeted at the whole Iraqi economy and not specifically at Saddam Hussein and the ruling Ba'th party regime.

The United States underestimated the willingness of Hussein to subject his population to a painful humanitarian decline in the standard of living. Furthermore, for Saddam Hussein to withdraw his forces without a fight would mean a loss of face, a cultural embarrassment for an Arab leader bent on establishing hegemony in the region. "Finally, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft warned that there was serious concern that the systematic destruction infrastructure in Kuwait by the Iraq occupation force was shortening the time that the United States could wait for economic sanctions to drive Iraq out." 14

Did the United States and UN coalition have a monopoly advantage that it could exploit against Iraq?

The United States quickly established a political and military advantage over Saddam Hussein's regime. The UN Security Council reacted without hesitation to establish the international legal framework to employ military enforced sanctions. The coalition of Naval forces immediately gained maritime superiority taking advantage of Iraq's limited access to the sea. Additionally, President Bush reacted quickly to politically secure the support of the neighboring countries of Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in an effort to tighten the sanction enforcement. "The nearly unanimous international support for military enforced economic sanctions and the geographic advantage of physically isolating Iraq gave the UN coalition a distinct advantage in implementing the sanctions."

Is the sanction's likely impact so large that it may persuade Iraq to change its policies?

"Prior to August 1990, Iraq imported 75% of its food requirements and nearly 100% of its military hardware requirements. Oil and dates were the only economically significant export Iraq had to barter with or gain hard currency." ¹⁶ The combination of these facts and the political/military cohesion of the UN coalition significantly increased the likelihood that the sanctions would have a noticeable and quick affect on the Iraqi economy.

"As early as December 1990, export earnings, principally from oil, dropped more than 90% and imports experienced an equivalent decline." By all measurements, the military enforced economic sanctions between August 1990 and January 1991 had a large and very blunt impact on the Iraqi economy. However, evidence indicates that Saddam Hussein and his regime remained untouched and even profited from the ensuing black-market of goods.

Is the sanction's probable impact on the United States or Coalition States economies small enough not to cause significant harm to domestic workers, suppliers, shareholders and consumers?

President Bush, concerned that the American public would turn against the operations, launched a multilateral burden-sharing program under which all participating nations would share in the financial costs of the military deployment and in compensating nations suffering financially from the sanctions because of their special trade relations with Iraq. Jordan and Turkey were the prime recipients of this aid. Saudi Arabia agreed to increase production of oil to stabilize the world market price and demand because of the loss of Iraqi crude. "Additionally, President Bush succeeded in convincing congress to forgo Egypt's \$7.1 billion debt for military sales and to increase military sales to Israel by \$1 billion."

Overall the United States, Saudi Arabia, and UN Sanctions Committee adroitly minimized the impact on economically vulnerable countries and stabilized the fluctuation of world oil prices.

In summary, both the strengths and weaknesses of military enforced economic sanctions against Iraq were apparent. The positive strengths included:

- Sanctions were multilaterally executed through the United Nations under the auspices of the UN charter and international law. Additionally, the sanctions had worldwide support as a tool of diplomacy.
- Sanctions strategically targeted weaknesses in Iraq's economy accentuating their effectiveness. (i.e. oil export, commodity imports, and military hardware import).
- Military enforcement effectively isolated Iraq via land and sea trade routes.
- The UN adequately compensated neutral nations that were adversely affected economically by the sanctions.
- Sanctions successfully weakened Iraq's military ability to conduct offensive or defensive operations.

Areas of weakness or failure to achieve the objective include:

- Ultimately armed conflict was necessary to roll back Iraqi forces from Kuwait and deter any further aggression.
- Failed to target Saddam Hussein or the elite's of the Ba'th party regime. Created a black market that the elite could further profit from.
- Did not restrict Saddam Hussein's ability to distribute propaganda to the Arab and international world. His access to media outlets was actually enhanced.
- The sanctions were most felt by the population ruled by a dictatorial regime. There was a
 considerable drop in the standard of living and the humanitarian pain offered a rallying point
 for Saddam Hussein to fan the fires of nationalism.
- Finally, the objective of convincing Saddam Hussein to voluntarily withdraw his forces from Kuwait was unattainable based on the potential wealth of the captured territory and the psyche of Saddam Hussein as an Arab and his perceived regional hegemony.

SERBIA CASE STUDY

The employment of multilateral economic sanctions against Serbia provides a superb case study to analyze the success and failures of military enforced sanctions gradually escalated and kept in place for a longer period of time. The United States and Allies gradually enforced an embargo of all exports and imports via land, sea and air. This was accomplished over a four-year period (1991-1995) and took an enormous diplomatic effort to coordinate and implement these sanctions. In this case study the reader must keep in mind that the question of United States vital security interest was a hotly debated issue and American participation and armed conflict was not necessarily a realistic end state.

Were the sanction objectives limited enough to be achievable?

The objective of the sanctions against Serbia were to convince Slobadon Milosevic and Serbia to stop economically and militarily supporting the Bosnian Serbs as they attempted to form a new ethnically cleansed Republic of Srpska in Bosnia Herzegovina. Strategically, this was an achievable goal. Serbia and Montenegro were vulnerable to oil, food and commodity imports. The population was accustomed to a higher western style of living and the new democratic political system made Milosevic more vulnerable to discontent. However, it would take an enormous effort to politically and militarily execute an effective embargo based on the land, sea and river borders with neighboring states. Although, numerous human rights atrocities were noted, there was no initial international pressure to proceed to armed conflict without permitting economic sanctions to run its course.

Did the United States and WEU/NATO have a monopoly advantage that it could exploit against Serbia and Milosevic?

The United States and WEU/NATO used the legal framework of the UN Charter, quickly established maritime superiority in the Adriatic Sea. "Later in June of 1993, the WEU established a Danube Patrol Mission consisting of eight patrol boats manned with customs and police officials. This maritime river patrol combined with the established sanctions assistance missions (SAM) at border crossings provided the necessary embargo enforcement to significantly enhance the maritime sea interdiction." The Serbian economy was vulnerable to an oil embargo and was heavily reliant on commodity trade with neighboring countries for hard currency. However, the arms embargo was a failed effort. The Balkans was one of the most heavily militarized regions of Europe. This was based on a flourishing organic weapons industry and the historical philosophy of the former Yugoslavia to arm the armies and stockpile weapons with local militias.

Is the sanction's likely impact so large that it may persuade Serbia to change its policies?

The short answer is yes. The Serbian people were use to a decent standard of living and had exercised an ability to organize and challenge the Milosevic regime. Peace and prosperity were dreams that came along with the new somewhat democratic government process. The population was educated and had access to international news and opinion. The new privatized economy was vulnerable to a energy and trade embargo. Indeed, there were mass rallies against the Milosevic regime about the ongoing support of the war in Bosnia Herzegovina. However, Milosevic was a master of survival and was able to turn the tables by controlling propaganda to rally nationalistic support to continue to withstand the pain of sanctions. His regime like Saddam Hussein's, profited from the black market sanctions brought about. This occurred because the sanctions were blunt and did not target Milosevic or his elite's personal wealth. Ultimately, Milosevic caved into the diplomatic pressure brought about by sanctions when his economy further weakened, the Bosnian Serb military success stalled and the NATO air strike threat was a reality.

Is the sanction's probable impact on the United States or Coalition States economies small enough not to cause significant harm to domestic workers, suppliers, shareholders and consumers?

"For the first time in history major regional organizations such as the EU,WEU, and NATO stepped up to provide the institutional and financial resources for effective sanctions implementation." Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, all eager to establish better relations with the western European nations and NATO willingly participated in the embargo. The United States military operating budget absorbed a significant cost of the naval presence in the Adriatic Sea. Any short term economic pain throughout Europe was quietly absorbed due in part to the strong support the sanctions policy enjoyed and the adversity to armed intervention, which was the next option.

In summary, the military enforced economic sanctions against Serbia demonstrated several strengths and weaknesses as a diplomatic course of action. The positive strengths included:

- Sanctions were multilaterally executed through regional organizations under the auspices of the UN charter and international law. They enjoyed worldwide support as a tool of diplomacy.
- Sanctions did strategically target weaknesses in Serbia's economy, which accentuated the
 effectiveness (i.e. oil export, commodity and resource import/export).
- Through maritime interdiction, innovative (SAM's) customs officials, and cooperative Border States Serbia was effectively isolated via land and sea trade routes.
- Neutral nations (Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania) demonstrated a willingness to participate despite receiving limited economic compensation.
- Finally, the objectives were attainable through sanctions enforcement and the diplomatic situation enabled the sanctions effort to be played out for several years.

Areas of weakness or failure to achieve the objective include:

- Ultimately limited air strikes were necessary to send a message of commitment to Serbia.
 Additionally, there were continued and tragic losses of civilian lives in fighting in addition to ethnic cleansing in all three regions.
- Sanctions failed to target Slobadon Milosevic or the elite's of his political regime. Additionally, they created a black market that the elite could further profit from.
- Sanctions did not target Milosevic and his financial supporters. Some government assets
 were frozen but the bulk remained in safe havens with easy access. Additionally, his access
 to media outlets was actually enhanced raising his prestige among the Serbian people.
- The sanctions were most felt by the population ruled by a dictatorial regime. There was a considerable drop in the standard of living and the humanitarian pain offered a rallying point for Milosevic to fan the fires of nationalism.

RECOMMENDATION

As evident from the Iraqi and Serbian case studies, military enforced economic sanctions remain a viable and vital diplomatic tool for United States foreign policy and military strategy. Therefore, it is imperative that the United States take the international lead in charting a new course for more effective economic sanction enforcement.

Conclusions from the previous analysis underscore several factors, which will provide the future template for military enforced economic sanctions. A successful sanctions plan in the 21st century must begin with a foundation based on:

- Multilateral participation by a coalition of nations.
- An international legal precedence established by the United Nations.
- Military superiority (maritime and customs police).
- Monopoly advantage over critical economic commodities.
- A financial mechanism to compensate neutral countries for financial loss.

Next this future sanctions plan must restructure to eliminate shortcomings such as:

- Inability to minimize adverse economic impacts on the civilian population (humanitarian suffering).
- Inability to isolate and economically target individual Heads of State, regime elite's and financial supporters.
- Inability to isolate external business affairs, communication links and propaganda outlets to minimize false prestige and nationalistic furor.

TARGET WHAT GIVES STRENGTH TO THE REGIME

To eliminate these shortcomings, the United States Military Strategy must adapt by embracing the concepts of <u>information isolation and smart sanctions</u> as tools to provide synergism to traditional military sanction enforcement. Future sanctions must target what gives strength to regimes...international finance, wealth and communication capability. Successful implementation of smart sanctions and information isolation would specifically target the small group of political decision-makers rather than civilian populous in general. With proper pre-planning and quick, decisive action, the financial foundation from which regimes (and economic elite's) gather their strength would dry up. Financial collapse would be a distinct possibility well before any humanitarian hardship would be felt on the civilian population. If smart sanctions and information isolation are instituted first, regimes could not profit from a black market for goods. If executed in conjunction with a physical embargo, information isolation provides the immediate adverse financial impact and an embargo provides the long term weakening of the regime's foundation.

EXECUTING THE NEW INFORMATION ISOLATION MISSION

On January 6th, 2000, the Pentagon publicly acknowledged its plan to conduct offensive information warfare operations. The new Cyberwarfare center will be established at Space Command's headquarters in Colorado Springs and be operational by October 1st, 2000. "The Cyberwarfare Center will help U.S. military commands around the world with tools and expertise to conduct electronic warfare. The command will seek to coordinate the computer expertise of various military services and also work policy and legal implications arising from the unconventional warfare."

Under this command structure, the Cyberwarfare center can formulate an information isolation campaign plan by acting as a clearinghouse for the Intelligence Agencies, Treasury Department, State Department and the Unified CINC. The State Department and Intelligence Agencies would concentrate on identifying the political elite of a regime. Next, the Treasury Department through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) can apply new tracking software to identify the location of the regime and its financial supporter's assets. The Cyberwarfare Center would concentrate on formulating an interdiction Plan for external telephone and satellite access in addition to, preparing plans for interdicting external broadcast signals (radio and television).

"The United States has had great success in recent years tracking money laundering by drug lords and has gained an extraordinary degree of compliance with US and world banks. "Elaborate technologies such as name recognition software have been developed that allow banks officials to identify and interdict transactions by targeting individuals." Although the specifics of how the US military would interdict telecommunications and television signals are classified; this surgical capability exists based on numerous unclassified articles and previous use of limited psychological operations (TV and radio Broadcast interdiction) reported in the press. This technical ability provides several benefits to improve physical sanctions enforcement. First, interdicting external communications (out of country telephone use) reduces the reliability of electronic commerce and information flow. Additionally, it gives the United States the ability to target specific communications nodes related to external trade. Second, interdicting media propaganda outlets disrupts a targeted nation or regimes ability to disburse misinformation or propaganda.

The key to success of smart sanctions and information isolation as a synergetic tool of military enforced economic sanctions is preparation (research) and quick, decisive implementation. This can be accomplished through determined diplomacy within the United Nations framework and well-organized US interagency coordination. Once accomplished, the Cyberwarfare Center can develop a strategic campaign plan and coordinate the information isolation execution plan by the Unified CINC and other participating Agencies.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF USING INFORMATION ISOLATION TO ENHANCE SANCTIONS

International law has not yet resolved ambiguities over the characterization of information warfare activities. "This leaves space for the United States and others to conduct information warfare activities, perhaps even in peacetime, without significant legal repercussions. This legal status quo may appear satisfactory to U.S. policymakers." Since the United States leads in Information warfare development, legal ambiguity can be advantageous, allowing the United States to apply its technological strength to international conflicts in ways beyond the capacities of anyone else. This is an important concept in the current development of information warfare. The use of offensive information warfare may be far off but specific aspects of information isolation as defined earlier have immediate and relative application today.

It is imperative that the United States frame its desire to incorporate information isolation within the international legal framework of sanctions enforcement. It is the author's opinion that this legal framework exists within Chapter VII, Article 41 of the United Nations Charter. "The Charter of the United Nations, drafted 50 years ago, appears to contemplate such interference with a country's communications as infoblockades. Article 41 provides that in its effort to address breaches of the peace, the UN Security Council may call upon UN members to disrupt an aggressor's rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and any other means of communication." ²⁴ This interpretation of the Chapter VII article provides the international legal basis for economic sanctions, and information isolation actions fit perfectly within this legal framework. Furthermore, Article 42 provides the legal structure for military enforcement of aspects of information isolation.

This is a very important interpretation, as new military technology can be applied under existing legal authority. The United States can use this legal foundation as a starting point to convince the Security Council that information isolation actions in conjunction with smart sanctions must be incorporated in any future military enforced economic sanctions.

MODEL FOR FUTURE MILITARY ENFORCED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

On the diplomatic continuum from peace to armed conflict, smart sanctions and information isolation can be a less expensive diplomatic tool used prior to physical interdiction. To accomplish this, the United States and coalition Allies must effectively target a regimes financial holdings outside the country. Additionally, the regime's financial supporters must be targeted to interdict electronic commerce outside of the country borders. Through continued international pressure (coalition), credit access must be eliminated. After a period of time if these actions do not stimulate a change in policy, the United States and its Allies can add more options to the information isolation plan. One such option is to interdict external communications leaving the borders of the country. This would include telecommunications, Internet access and the export of television signals. The advantage to this step approach is the civilian population has not directly experienced physical deprivation from a commodity embargo. The regime has borne the blunt of the smart sanctions and communications chaos. If these actions have not elicited a policy change then the international community can move to a physical military enforced embargo. They can do this with the clear concept that their sanctions policy targeted the regime first; made every effort to minimize humanitarian suffering; and minimized the regimes ability to rally the masses around a nationalistic cause. This final stage would entail similar physical embargo efforts as demonstrated in the Iraq and Serbia case studies with the addition of active media effort to provide objective information to the civilian population outlining the reason that the international community is enforcing a physical and information embargo.

In summary, this new model adroitly addresses the weaknesses of traditional sanctions and adds a new first dimension to diplomatic and military enforcement actions. Its economic denial premise has evolved with the globalization of the world economy and it has added an immediate impact potential to a traditional sanction policy that may have taken months or even years to gain success.

CONCLUSION

As evident from the Iraq and Serbia case studies, military enforcement of economic sanctions remains a vital diplomatic tool for the United States. Maritime superiority will ensure that the United States has the capability to lead multilateral sanctions enforcement by physical means. However, the United States must address four areas to improve sanctions enforcement. First, it must minimize the adverse impact on the civilian population (humanitarian suffering). Second, it must design sanctions to isolate and economically target regime Heads of State, regime elite and their financial supporters. Third, sanctions must isolate external business affairs, communication links, and propaganda outlets to minimize a backlash of nationalistic furor. Finally, future sanctions must address the fact that information technology has become the favored method of world commerce, which no physical blockade can control.

An effective <u>smart sanctions</u> and <u>information isolation plan</u> would succeed in addressing these four areas of concern. The synergism of rapidly effective information interdiction and the long-term deterioration of a physical blockade add potency to military operations in support of economic sanctions. Additionally, information isolation operations offer a low cost and surgical option to sequentially ratchet up or limit interdiction actions. This makes it a more flexible and desirable tool of diplomacy. And in the absence of specific laws, the United Nations Charter and subsequent resolutions that authorize a physical embargo, can apply for an information isolation plan.

One area of concern that must be mentioned is the United States' vulnerability to a cyber-counterattack. Militarily, a sanction-targeted country would find it difficult to challenge the United States based on our maritime superiority. However, an information counter-attack is possible. The American economy is dependent on electronic commerce and thus somewhat vulnerable to a sophisticated attack/counterattack. It is imperative that the United States continue to invest in defensive measures and not let this potential fear deter advances in cyberwarfare research. As this nation has improved its defense against terrorism, it must strive to do the same in defensive cyberwarfare.

The time has come for the United States to apply elements of information interdiction to enhance the success of military enforced economic sanctions in the 21st century.

Word Count: 5,997

ENDNOTES

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